Using the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as a case study, this paper asks: firstly, to what extent is the use of digital communications technologies (DCTs), in particular social media, associated with fundamental changes to campaign organisations, specifically to the command and control model? Secondly, under what conditions are challenges to the model more likely to emerge? Using mixed methods, our analysis of the case demonstrates that radical organisational or strategic change is not inevitable, nor is there a one-sizefits-all approach. Technologies are not 'just tools' that any campaign with enough resources will adopt in similar ways. Instead, depending on a number of interdependent factors (i.e. context, resources, strategy, organisational structure and culture), some campaigns-like Better Together-selectively adopt digital tools that fit with the command and control model; in other cases-like Yes Scotland-the application of DCTs and the dynamics created by linking to other (digital-enabled) grassroots organisations can have transformative effects.
relevant not only to referenda, which are increasingly important, but also to electoral campaigns more generally.
The distinctiveness of our study resides not only in the characteristics of its subject-the referendum-but also our mixed methodology, which combines the use of computational techniques to analyse the differences in the pattern of Twitter activity between the two campaigns and key groups, and in-depth interviews with key campaign stakeholders. This provides a rich and innovative empirical analysis of how and why DCTs-and especially social media-are used by, and affect, competing campaigns.
The paper will first discuss the impact of DCTs on parties and campaign organisations, with emphasis on the concept of organizational hybridity. The second section explains our methodology. The final sections focus on the analysis first of the Twitter data and then of the interviews. We conclude by highlighting the significance of our findings for the study of electoral campaigns and the impact of social media, and DCTs more broadly, in politics. guidance (Vaccari, 2010) or 'computational management' (Kreiss, 2012) to manage participation, with the emphasis on 'controlled interactivity' (Stromer-Galley, 2014) . Supporters become message multipliers and even 'brand advocates', but generally have little input over policy or strategy. Thus, much research has argued that DCT use often falls well short of the higher ideals of deliberative and participatory democracy, even if they have some success at mobilization (Howard, 2006; Stromer-Galley, 2014) . On the other hand, the more optimistic accounts of DCTs and citizenship have stressed their potential to fit with 'actualizing' (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011) or 'engaged' (Dalton, 2008) modes of participation, although more for civic than party organisations (Wells, 2015) .
Ultimately, as Chadwick and Stromer-Galley argue, the degree and kind of participation associated with digital tools depends upon how they 'are assembled and organizationally enacted ' (2016, p. 285) . But how is this manifested in practice and how can it be explained? In other words, how do different campaign organisations react to these possibilities and challenges and which factors help to explain why they do so?
A large body of literature has demonstrated the impact of changes associated with the digital revolution on policy-advocacy arenas and especially social movements (e.g. Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005; Chadwick & Dennis, 2017; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Karpf, 2012) . Research about the impact on electoral campaign organisations is less common but it is clear nonetheless that the adoption of digital tools is now commonplace and that they are used in a range of both back-end and public-facing functions (Kreiss, 2012; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011; Nielsen, 2012; Vaccari, 2010) . Much of the election campaign research has focused on testing the normalization vs. equalization hypotheses (see Gibson & McAllister, 2015) and thus on the effects of party size, funding and incumbency. However, aside of the impact of resources, less is known about how and why campaign organisations differentially adopt and adapt to the use of DTCs, and the 'micro-incentives' (Vaccari 2010) and constraints for doing so. Moreover, existing studies have tended to focus on analysis of content such as websites or tweets (e.g. Gibson, 2015; Graham, Jackson, & Broersma, 2014; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011) , while research incorporating the input from campaign actors themselves is rare (for some insightful exceptions see Baldwin-Philippi, 2015; Kreiss, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014; Vaccari, 2010) , as is that integrating the analysis of the role of actors outside the official campaigns. This paucity is especially marked outside the US, which both technologically and institutionally is a rather exceptional case (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008; Bimber, 2014) .
It is clear, however, that it cannot be assumed that the use of DCTs leads to far-reaching nor one size-fits-all changes to the command and control model of campaigning. There are thus two key arguments at the core of our analysis. Firstly, it is not just a matter of access to technology; how it is used, and thus the challenges to the command and control model, are conditional to a number of other inter-dependent factors. Secondly, change results on hybridity rather than replacing the 'old' with the 'new'. The beauty of the concept of hybridity it is that it avoids unhelpful dichotomies, and leads us to '"not only, but also" patterns of thought (Chadwick, 2013) . A hybrid campaign organization is one where there is a blend of organizational structures and strategies found in electoral politics with characteristics more typically associated with some social movements, especially digitally networked ones with 'post-bureaucratic' characteristics that emerged in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Baldwin-Philippi, 2015; Wells, 2015) . Secondly, it refers to the organizational arrangements that enable this and also enhance it, in a two-way dynamic between modes of engagement and organizational structure.
Below we schematically summarise the main dimensions that characterize traditional electoral and networked movement-like organisations. There is a degree of overlap between some categories but each pair emphasises a different dimension. Moreover, these categories are a matter of degree with most campaigns falling somewhere along the continuum, and movement from one type to the other is as an adaption that represents a shift along the spectrum, rather than replacement of one type of organization with another.
Traditional electoral organisations Networked movement-like organisations
Elites/campaign professionals Greater/more diverse grassroot participation Top down/one-to-many/broadcasting Bottom-up/many-to-many/interactive/coproduction and peer-sharing Management  Empowerment and self-expression 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w According to US research, the most successful electoral campaigns increasingly combine elements of both types, albeit to different extents (Bimber, 2014; Chadwick, 2013; Kreiss, 2009 Kreiss, , 2012 Vaccari, 2010) . Moreover, how much and how they do so is mediated by the interplay of a number of factors. We will demonstrate that in addition to resources, which as explained above has been the focus of much of the previous research, one must consider contextual, strategic, organisational and cultural factors. Furthermore, our research contributes towards understanding how these processes work outside the US-where previous research has focused-and how specifically they work in the context of a heated constitutional referendum.
Thus, drawing on the analytical framework above, we analyse to what extent, how and why the two campaigns in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum blended the two types of organization and practices in their use of DCTs, focusing on social media. As with any single case study, we are not able to generalise. Nonetheless, we offer a detailed exploration that enables us to better understand the dynamics at play and the range of factors involved. Before we proceed to our analysis, the next section explains our methodology.
Methodology
We employed a mixed methods approach: in-depth interviews alongside a network analysis of posts in the social media platform Twitter 2 . The focus is not on the content of the tweets, nor on the use of Twitter specifically; instead we analyse Twitter data to provide a window into the characteristics of the two campaigns and their wider network of relations (Segerberg & Bennett, 2011, p. 201) . This 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 'window' has its limitations and provides only one way of examining the campaigns' structure and strategies, which might be different to we might learn from other platforms, given differences in affordances, norms and reach (Gerbaudo, 2012; Kreiss, Lawrence, & McGregor, 2018) ; nonetheless, it is highly insightful in combination with the interview data.
We collected tweets using the public search application programming We subsequently conducted twelve in-depth interviews asking how and why the two sides in the referendum used social media and DCTs more generally, and how this connected to strategies, actors and context. The rich insights from the interviews enabled us to 'reconstruct the operating philosophies of elite political actors' (Vaccari, 2010, p. 335) , exploring how and why they believe they used technology as they did, while the analysis of the twitter networks helps reveal some of the ways that the campaigns and other actors actually used it. The interviewees were four key staffers from each of the official campaigns, and three leading members of groups that were highly active in the digital sphere during the referendum but were not, at least formally, part of the umbrella organisations. In addition, we interviewed one journalist focused on digital issues, who was mentioned several times in the interviews as someone with useful insights into both campaigns. From the official campaigns, we selected those responsible for leading (Shepard & Quinlan, 2016) . Our macro analysis based on measures of centrality in Figure 1 also shows that the Yes side dominated the conversation in Twitter: the blue nodes coded as Yes were more central, and
heavily outweigh the red No-aligned nodes 6 . To further explore these differences, in Figures 2 and 3 we specifically visualize the connection between the official campaign accounts and the accounts of key groups aligned with them 8 . Given our aims, and that only a small fraction of the findings can be visualised in detail, we selected a subset of accounts from their ego-networks. The selection criteria for the visualisation were as follows: the accounts had to have a reciprocal relationship in Twitter with the official campaign; they had to support the official campaigns side of the debate; they had to be organisations or websites that identified as a collective, rather than individual Overall, the analysis suggests that Yes Scotland's twitter engagement with key groups is more hybrid, i.e. less centralized, and combining autonomy and control, a blend that is essentially absent for Better Together. The key difference is Figure 2 there is a lack of interconnections between the No-aligned accounts, in a way that most closely resembles the hub-and-spoke or star structure associated with centrally managed hierarchical networks (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) . In contrast, although the Yes subnet in Figure 3 also has a dominant official campaign node at its centre, the breadth of interconnections and levels of activity between intermediate nodes shows a higher degree of decentralization.
Figure 1
Regarding differences in the degree of autonomy, Figure 3 also shows that a number of Yes-aligned accounts were at times creating more output on Twitter than the official campaign; National Collective is the most active of these accounts.
There is also an indication that a different pattern of engagement is taking place. In a heavily centralized campaign we would expect traffic to largely use the official campaign as a conduit in order to communicate with other parts of the network; 
Long Live Command & Control?
The analysis of the Twitter networks, and especially the relationship between the official campaigns and key groups, show revealing differences between the two sides. However, this analysis is for us a window into the broader characteristics of the official campaigns, their networks and how they used social media, and DCTs. The interviews with key campaign staff and associated groups are an essential complement to understand continuity and change with the control and command model, and especially the reasons for the differences and similarities between the campaigns. This is discussed in the next two sections.
The interviews reveal that digital tools enabled some innovations in their campaign practices, but their disruptive impact on the command & control model Together. Both official campaigns highlighted the usefulness of a range of DCTs on recruiting volunteers, briefing them, and coordinating and monitoring their activities, both online and offline. They also referred to their usefulness for fundraising, especially for small donations, and to the promise of crowdfunding initiatives; but these capabilities were exploited only to a limited extent, in part because of UK campaign funding regulation (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008) . Social media were also regarded as having facilitated new forms of networked peer-topeer persuasion and a degree of self-organization among groups on both sides.
Furthermore, the interviewees explained that the content, form and targets of the official campaign messages were influenced to some degree by email and social media metrics, especially Facebook's, which were monitored regularly-although in a rather amateur fashion-to calibrate which issues were of greatest interest, by whom, and which messages, both in terms of content and presentation, got the most positive responses.
However, there is little evidence from the interviews that the capabilities of digital tools, or information obtained from them, were major influences on campaign strategy by either side. Firstly, established techniques such as focus groups and polling were mentioned as much more important tools in this regard.
Secondly, the emphasis from both official campaigns was on transmitting campaign messages rather than two-way engagement. Attention focused on ensuring that there was coherence across media messages and with activities on the ground, with campaign managers playing a key role in coordination and monitoring. Moreover, social media, and Twitter in particular, were highlighted as a key tool that could be used to try to influence the mainstream media and thus 'the dimensions to it. Crucially, however, there were also significant differences between the two campaigns, which were a result of the interplay between contextual, strategic, organisational and cultural factors.
In terms of strategy, the most important difference lay in Better Together's concentration on uncommitted voters as the key to winning the vote. Campaign messages were relentlessly aimed at this group, pointing out the risks associated with separation, to the extent that the campaign was dubbed (initially by Better
Together staffers) as 'Project Fear'. Yes Scotland, while also targeting uncommitted voters, gave more weight to addressing and mobilizing their own supporters. Crucially, these differences were reflected in, and in turn reinforced by, the respective campaigns' digital strategies.
Better Together: Top down, On message
Despite recruiting the services of Blue State Digital, famously associated with the Obama campaigns, Better Together's digital strategy placed little emphasis on self-expression, empowering and mobilizing. Instead, the interviews revealed a remarkable accent on control and discipline; the use of 'we' firmly restricted to campaign professionals at the centre:
'We were fairly disciplined in our approach to that…our local groups had their own Facebook groups which were largely there to advertise local meetings and things like that, and to, sort of, amplify what we were doing nationally. The truth is that in a campaign as heated as this was on both sides, people freelancing was a problem, because Only staff could post events to the Better Together website, whereas anyone could create and advertise events on the official campaign website for Yes
Scotland. There were less stringent controls over social media; many pro-Union groups were 'given' an account and some were allowed to create their own social media identities. But campaign managers made it clear that 'nothing with the Better
Together brand would be run without a degree of editorial control by staff members' (Interview 2, No Campaign).
In summary, the use of social media, and DCTs generally, by Better
Together was not transformative either within the official campaign organization or in its relations with supporting groups. There was little openness and decentralization or 'blending' of the more entrepreneurial participatory modes associated with DCTs in cutting-edge contemporary campaigns. This was not a result of lack of resources. It was a consequence of the campaign's strategy, which in turn related to the political context, the characteristics of the coalition, and the organizational structure and culture that underpinned it. Firstly, and crucially, it played to what the interviewees saw as the objectives and strategy of the No campaign. It was a short-term coalition with the single objective of winning the referendum vote. It avoided 'emotional messages' related to identity or other issues that could help mobilize but would have exposed differences between the uneasy coalition of political parties; instead, they focused on using polling combined with Chadwick, 2013; Kreiss, 2014) . Together, this was a result of the interplay of contextual, strategic, organisational and cultural factors that affected how they used DCTs, which in turn reinforced pre-exiting dynamics.
Yes Scotland and the key role of 'online allies'
There are two important contextual factors that shaped Yes Scotland's overall strategy, which in turn affected their use of DCTs: their trailing position in the polls and the weak support in the mainstream media.
Regarding the latter, social media was deemed particularly important as it gave Yes Scotland an alternative channel to what they regarded as a hostile press and broadcast media. But it was not the only purpose; social media communication was also seen as a means of motivating and expanding the activist base:
'So apart from being the counterbalance to the mainstream media, to the anti-independence media if you like, it [social media] was also one of the more obvious means through which we could communicate the kind of campaign that we wanted to run and begin to create that national movement' (Interview 1, Yes Campaign).
Moreover, considerable emphasis was laid by the Yes campaign on training and educating, not just so that activists could relay official messages, but also regularly and to help promote our material, but also to train other people and to encourage other people to behave in the way we behave.
And also, the behaviour thing was less important for us than the getting people to understand the message and understand where we were at that point in the campaign and what to do, and how to produce their own content' (Interview 3, Yes Campaign).
This mobilizing strategy was facilitated and reinforced by several factors, which might be overlooked if one focuses exclusively on Yes Scotland position as 'challenger'. Firstly, there is the prominence given to Digital in the official campaign organization. Unlike Better Together, it had a dedicated team, with its Director-a respected figure in digital publishing-one of the very first hires.
Moreover, he reported directly to the Chief Executive-who himself came from outside the election campaigns field-and was put on an equal footing with the other Directors. Secondly, Yes Scotland was able to draw not only on the size and enthusiasm of the SNP's membership, which was also much younger in average, but also on its digital expertise and culture:
'The SNP has actually got a good understanding of how digital works and a commitment to it. So these people were pre-prepared (…) that was very useful in terms of establishing just a culture of digital as part of what we do' (Interview 3, Yes campaign) The SNP is…even from an organisational level or other social media, it is very rigid and very…in a sense, they have to be a lot more, because they're a membership organisation, whereas we were never a membership organisation which meant we…you can't impute responsibility for anyone's actions, although many people tried. Whereas with the SNP, they're far more often responsible for the actions of councillors or anything like that. So theirs is a very controlled…our message was still very controlled. Our…what we put out in the core things we'd put out, they were always the same themes. But the SNP, you don't know anything unless they tell you. Whereas there was so much information and research on…the independence campaign was so broad (Interview 5, Yes Scotland) Secondly, and crucially, there were important differences on the degree of grassroot support each campaign could tap on and how they chose to interact with pre-exiting and new groups. In fact, it is in the relationship of each campaign vis-à-vis other groups that the differences between the Yes and No campaigns are most striking (as illustrated in the twitter analysis above). Both campaigns created some local and sectoral groups, whereas a number of other were formed independently.
But there were many more for Yes Scotland (circa 350 vs. 80) and their online presence was subject to less control and interference from the official campaign. 'I would say that National Collective were a huge part of the effort in terms of producing some really, really good content. They had a lot of fun during the campaign and it showed in the material they produced, which we were then able to on-share and expose to a really enormous audience. Bella Caledonia as well. We would re-tweet Women for Independence, Business Scotland material as well, and Labour for Independence' (Interview 3, Yes Campaign).
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Together assimilated groups within their own campaign and funding structures, ensuring greater control: 'We took the decision that Academics, Women Together, all these groups, we would bring in house, they'd be in our funding, we could then work together, but in terms of the work they did it would be independent, it was just they were part of Better Together' (Interview 7, No Campaign). Yes
Scotland's different approach to external groups was in part pragmatic, simply because they had limited influence over a number of organisations. But greater autonomy was considered acceptable because this wider base was seen to add both energy and breadth to the campaign. It fitted with what Yes Scotland defined as their strategic objectives, which included developing into a 'movement'.
In fact, according to one senior source, 'we very much had to be not like a 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w
However, we should not exaggerate either the differences between the two campaigns nor the impact of the use of DCTs on the command and control model.
Better Together did take some steps to encourage participation and develop supporter groups, even though its key priority was maintaining control over message and activity, which was reflected in its digital strategy. For its part, the Yes campaign was hardly a hybrid participatory 'nirvana'. Although the independence movement at large had more horizontal and participatory characteristics, and these influenced the official campaign, there were tensions, especially with the SNP. Not only there was in Yes Scotland a strong continuity with the professional model, but the campaign managers remained nervous about their inability to control, and specifically about the risks associated with the way social media was used by some of its 'online allies' and individual supporters.
Firstly, although DCTs facilitated greater participation, some of that activity was regarded as an inefficient use of resources, and on occasions as a distraction with potentially damaging repercussions (e.g. protests against 'BBC bias').
Secondly, they feared the central campaign message was sometimes drowned out because: "There was so much information [out there and the] independence campaign was so broad with Radical Independence [etc.] putting out their own ideas so we had to repeat, repeat, repeat, messages in order to make sure that they were the ones getting through" (Interview 5, Yes Campaign). Finally, there was great frustration with trolling by what became known as the 'cyberNats': 'We distanced ourselves from that as much as possible and we issued guidelines, we got our supporters to stamp on that behaviour as much as possible. But it did hurt us'
(Interview 3, Yes Campaign). At the same time, there was a recognition within the official Yes campaign that because of how the affordances of the technology were enacted and the values that underpinned this-it was ineffectual to try to achieve full control: 'you are in a canoe on the rapids and you can't stop moving but you can avoid the rocks'
(Interview 3, Yes campaign). Trying too hard to enforce control was considered potentially 'enormously counterproductive' and had the potential to 'stifle initiative' (Interview 9, Yes campaign).
The best approach in the Yes campaigners' view was to develop 'an ability to just try and accept' that bottom-up autonomous participation, much of it digitally enabled, was a key element in generating and sustaining the passion of the proindependence campaign. A number of the interviewees also highlighted the importance of self-expression, and even enjoyment and fun, something that was entirely absent for Better Together. The official campaign did not accept all groups-or arguably any groups-as equal partners, but they were prepared to relinquish some of their ability to command and control to try to harness the creativity, enthusiasm and effort of local and sectoral groups and the 'online allies' that had sprung up, even where that resulted in the official campaign being bypassed and, on occasion, eclipsed.
Implications and conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on DCTs and electoral campaigns by providing a rich empirical analysis of two opposing campaigns, located at different points along the spectrum of hybridity, and unpacking some of the factors that help to explain the differences. Our research demonstrates firstly that the use of social In explaining the differences between the two sides, the interplay between contextual factors and the strategic choices made by campaign managers were highly significant. But so too were the organizational structure, and culture and values of key participants within and outside the official campaigns.
These are factors that have been less emphasised in previous studies on elections,
although not so in social movement research. As Chadwick (2007, 285) highlights, drawing on Tilly, collective action repertories 'are not simply neutral tools' to be adopted at will: 'values shape repertoires of collective action, which in turn shape the kind of adoption of organizational forms'. The same applies to DCTs; they are not "just technologies" that any campaign with enough resources will adopt in similar ways. There must be an elective affinity between digital media affordances and organisational culture, which mediate how they are enacted and their impact on organisational change. The values and repertoires of Better Together, a professionally and party-run, electorally-focused coalition with short-term goals, were restrictive and led to a controlled but stifling campaign and use of social media. This was in contrast to the pro-independence side, an insurgent campaign run by a mix of party and non-party experts and that-although with the SNP at its core-was situated within a vibrant independence movement, and thus could rely on a broader coalition of grassroot groups which had a more decentralised structure, and inclusive and participatory values. This was a key factor on shaping Technology and specialised consultancy can be bought, but other factors are less controllable factors, and yet they play a crucial role on mediating how digital tools are used and how it affects campaign models. We need to continue to develop a better understanding of the interaction between these factors, especially outside the United States.
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6 Centrality, or how important a node is to a network, can be measured in various ways. In this analysis we use betweenness centrality, which measures the number of shortest paths in the network that pass through a node (for a more detailed discussion of these concepts see Brandes and Erlebach (2005) ). In addition to constructing this network of interactions, we classified the nodes into a pro-Yes, pro-No, and neutral classification. This was done by manually coding the 600 most used hashtags in the dataset and then scoring the nodes in the network based on their usage of these hashtags. 7 These three types of Twitter affordances are not synonymous. However, we analysed them together because they all allow groups pursuing a common goal (independence/maintaining the union) to interact and share content. Moreover, the organisations included in the network are part of the outbound networks of the official campaigns, so it is highly unlikely that hostile engagement is taking place.
8 These networks visualisations were constructed using Gephi and the FruchtermanReingold (1991) force-directed method. The edges in the graph are directional and therefore two-way activity between nodes will have two edges, from source to target, and from target to source. The thickness of the edges is weighted by the relative amount of traffic passing along that edge.
9 Although we present a subset of the network here, the number of connections is taken from the whole dataset so as not to distort the importance of a node at the subset level.
10 The nodes are coloured based on their level of outward activity, for the Proindependence nodes the spectrum is from red to blue: National Collective (@wearenational) have the most outward activity. For the Pro-union nodes gradients of red are used, the stronger the red the more outward activity (@UKtogether and @Scottishlabour display the most outward activity).
11 The selection criteria were as follows: the accounts had to have a reciprocal relationship with the official campaign; and had to be local groups supporting Yes (this was based on the name of the accounts).
12 Using a number of private and public data-sources, Mosaic segments the population at the postcode level, classifying them according to demographics, lifestyles, consumer preferences and political opinions. Political parties use it to segment the electorate into types and tailor political messages accordingly.
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